As the Neil Walker trade talks heated up and eventually boiled over this afternoon, I suddenly saw a lot of Pirate fans on Twitter saying that they felt like the Pirates were “playing for 2017.” I wondered out loud where that idea had started (I’ve been keeping up with trade rumors this week, but not much else) and got my answer: ESPN’s David Schoenfeld wrote two days ago about the Pirates’ willingness to take a “small step back” by trading Walker and Mark Melancon in 2016 in service of being better in 2017 and 2018.
I don’t think that’s what’s happening here. To begin with, the Pirates only get so many years of Andrew McCutchen, Gerrit Cole, and Starling Marte together on the baseball field, and, as Andrew McCutchen’s knee injury reminded us earlier this year, they get even fewer years with each of them at the peak of their abilities.I’m positive that the Pirate front office has an eye on the years beyond 2018, because that’s the nature of running the Pittsburgh Pirates and that’s part of their job, but their primary job right now is maximizing their chances to win a World Series with this core.
Neil Walker is not really a part of that core, at least not anymore. By Baseball-Reference, he was the fourth most valuable Pirate in 2013, the fifth most valuable Pirate in 2014, and the tenth most valuable Pirate in 2015. He is a strong supporting player and a reliable second baseman, but the bell tolls for everyone on the Pittsburgh Pirates and Walker’s 2015 spike in strikeouts, steadily decreasing walk rate, and 30th birthday all mean that the bell was tolling for his Pirate career. Maybe he won’t drop off of a cliff next year, but he won’t be worth re-signing and giving him a qualifying offer to try and get a draft pick for him would be risky.
The best way to look at this is probably to think of it as a re-shuffling of assets around the diamond. The Pirates entered these winter meetings needing a first baseman and at least one starting pitcher, but with four infielders for three spots in Josh Harrison, Jung Ho Kang, Jordy Mercer, and Walker. By trading Walker, they fill the one glaring hole by dealing from their one strength point. The money is a wash, so they still have a decent amount to spend on more pitching/first base/relievers/etc. (they’re at about $60 million now before arbitration costs, with only Melancon expected to make a significant sum in aribtration).
There seems likely to be a drop-off from Walker to Josh Harrison, but I’m willing to bet it won’t be nearly as big as people are expecting. Harrison struggled last year, he missed time with an injury, he didn’t have the benefit of playing every day, and he still posted a 100 wRC+ compared to Walker’s 108. We don’t have ZiPS projections for the Pirates yet, but Steamer puts Walker at a 113 wRC+ next year and Harrison at 104. Harrison’s a better defender at second than Walker, so if Walker’s decline from 2015 sticks, the two players could almost be a wash at second base. The move robs the Pirates of some depth, which could be an issue given their yearly infield carousel, but the winter’s not over yet and there’s still Alen Hanson to be considered.
I don’t necessarily disagree with any of the points made in this Bucs Dugout post about it seeming like the Pirates could’ve gotten more for Walker, but I will offer a caveat to it: If the Pirates wanted Jon Niese, this was the trade they should have made. The Pirates obviously have some sort of internal list of pitchers they like and think they can work with, and it seems like many of the returns on acquiring those pitchers in recent years have been good. If the choice was between a pitcher on their list with iffy stats vs. one not on the list with better numbers, I’m OK with them making this decision. This trade is not just about Niese vs. Walker, it’s about Walker vs. Harrison and Niese vs. the unknowable chasm of an empty fifth rotation spot and Niese vs. Morton or Locke, should the Pirates acquire another starter.
When the Pirates make a move like this, the inevitable result is a lot of grumbling about how the Pirates have lost the Wild Card Game (or two Wild Card Games!) and how trading players like Walker dooms them to a lifetime of losing Wild Card Games. There is no magic formula or guaranteed number of regular season games to win to guarantee post-season success, though. Since 2000, these are the St. Louis Cardinals’ win totals:
- 2000 – 95
- 2001 – 93
- 2002 – 97
- 2003 – 85
- 2004 – 105
- 2005 – 100
- 2006 – 83
- 2007 – 78
- 2008 – 86
- 2009 – 91
- 2010 – 86
- 2011 – 90
- 2012 – 88
- 2013 – 97
- 2014 – 90
- 2015 – 100
In those 16 years, they won 90 or fewer games eight times and 91 or more eight times. Their two World Series wins came in 2006 and 2011, two of the years that fall into the “90 or fewer” category. The concept the Cardinals are built on isn’t trying to improve over the previous year’s team by X number of wins or to try and win 98 games every year, it’s simply to be good every year to maximize their chances of being in the playoffs, and that by being in the playoffs often enough, eventually everything breaks in their direction.
Given that this trade is basically a wash on money, it’s hard to argue it was made simply to dump Walker’s salary. Maybe it makes the Pirates immediately better (I suspect the Pirates think it does, even if not many people agree with them today), maybe it refocuses the roster and payroll in a way that they can do other things this winter. The question of whether it makes the 2016 Pirates better than the 2015 Pirates is a moot one, though: worse teams than the 2015 Pirates have won divisions and World Series in the past, and they will do so in the future. The only question that matters is whether or not the Pirates are building a team that can get to the playoffs in 2016. I think there’s work left to be done, but I don’t see why a trade like this one keeps them from doing that.
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